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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
The collapse of the capo regime 
President Vladimir Putin has made some very shrewd moves lately, moves that 
allowed him to punish transgressors in the government without really weakening 
them, to set up a potential successor in the prime minister's seat and then kick 
the chair out from underneath him before he could accrue undue influence, and, 
most dramatically, to set the political course for Russia by abandoning his 
detachment from party politics and embracing United Russia, a party he claims to 
have helped to found.  (1) 
 
During the course of events, a fundamental assumption underlying analyses of 
the Putin administration came jarringly to the surface: the collective Putin, and 
perhaps even the esprit de corps of the siloviki around him in general, is a myth.  
Whether or not it existed earlier in Putin's tenure, the Chekisty crew monolith 
clearly is no more.  
 
The search for the "teams" of advisers around Putin began in 1999, when he 
assumed the role of prime minister (for the first time, as the near future may 
show).  Friends from St. Petersburg, KGB associates from Germany and earlier 
in his career, Yel'tsin "Family" members, and other siloviki from other services 
who had helped Putin along, all rose to prominence and seemed to form distinct 
"clans" within the Putin Kremlin.  Clearly, there was infighting among these clans, 
but it arose in exceptional circumstances, such as the arrest of Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, which allegedly impelled Yel'tsin Family loyalist Aleksandr 
Voloshin to resign.  
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As the government settled into its role of primarily economic management, the 
circles of friends around Putin in the Kremlin came under scrutiny. The heavy 
presence of former security services officers was noted from nearly the beginning 
of the Putin presidency. However, the influx of associates from St. Petersburg, as 
well as a strong holdover contingent of Yel'tsin Family members, made Putin’s 
team seem, perhaps deceptively, diverse.  Eventually, former members of the 
Yel'tsin team were evident almost exclusively in the government, and the Kremlin 
personnel represented a strong security services presence. 
 
An article stemming from a research project based on interviews with Putin 
administration employees, identified some of Putin's closest advisers based on 
the frequency of their meetings with the president. (2)  The authors, Olga 
Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, emphasized the clannish aspect of the 
Putin Kremlin, noting Putin's tendency to meet with groups that seemed to 
represent institutions, such as the Security Council or Government. However the 
attendees of these meetings did not encompass the entire membership of the 
group they represented, and additionally included individuals who were not 
members of the institution.  These non-institutional, informal group meetings 
appeared to set out Putin's style of governance as more personal than 
institutionally based. 
 
Another facet of the research identified two individuals who were most often 
present at Putin's meetings, regardless of their institutional affiliation, and thus 
set them apart as, perhaps, the closest advisers to the president: Sergei Ivanov 
and Dmitri Medvedev.  (3)  
 
More recently, the status of Ivanov and Medvedev seemed to be confirmed by 
their positioning as frontrunner successors (via their appointments as First 
Deputy Prime Ministers, in particular) to President Putin in the lead up to the 
constitutionally-mandated 2008 presidential elections. 
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Putin's decision to accept the resignation of the Fradkov government last month 
and to appoint Viktor Zubkov as prime minister came as quite a surprise to many 
observers (who, given even the short lag time between resignation and 
appointment almost universally voiced the expectation that Sergei Ivanov would 
be the next PM), and to the first tier successor candidates, as well. 
 
Putin's clear signaling of his intent to lead United Russia, and eventually the 
Russian government, completed the reversal of the slow ebb of power away from 
the president that began with the elevation of his putative successors.  It also 
raises several questions about just who was aware of Putin's fall surprises, 
whether or not there is an unidentified consigliere (or consiglieri) in the Kremlin, 
and, perhaps most significantly to the former co-heirs apparent, whether or not 
they have lost the president's confidence. 
 
Within this context of a rattling of the Kremlin hierarchy, a previously identified 
close associate of the president's, Viktor Cherkesov, chose a public appeal, via 
the media in the form of Kommersant, to admonish his siloviki (even chekisty) 
colleagues not to begin an "internecine" battle, following the arrest of some of his 
deputies in the State Narcotics Control Agency. (4)  (For more on this issue, 
please see the "Security Services" section below.) 
 
For a member of Putin's inner circle, and siloviki inner circle at that, to move 
outside the tight knit group and address his colleagues (and by extension the 
president) publicly is clearly a remarkable event.  Cherkesov was believed to 
have the president's ear, but perhaps one of the former presidential lieutenants 
acted as his conduit to Putin.  The president's unexpected political 
announcements, which ended any speculation of a real successor, also have 
pulled the rug out from under his twin numbers two.  Putin also may have 
removed a keystone from his carefully-constructed Kremlin crew.  
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It well could be beneficial for Putin to sow confusion, as a means of stymieing 
ambition, in the ranks of his "colleagues."  The Cherkesov article may reflect the 
unleashing of open warfare (if only for a moment) when once there merely were 
skirmishes fought quietly and beneath the rug, among Putin's apparatchiki. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) "Concluding Remarks at the United Russia Party Congress," President Putin, 
1 Oct 07 via www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/10/01/2210 
_type82912type82913type84779_146510.shtml, accessed October 4, 2007.  
(2) "Inside the Putin court: A Research Note," by Olga Kryshtanovskaya and 
Stephen White, 1 Nov 05, Europe-Asia Studies, 57:7, pp. 1065-75, downloaded 
by [Ingenta Content Distribution] via jStor. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Nel'zya dopustit’, chtoby prevratilis' v torgovtsev, by Viktor Cherkesov, 9 Oct 
07 via www.kommersant.ru, accessed October 10, 2007. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
The new workplace 
A sea change is underway in Russia’s business community; self-made Russian 
business tycoons are being packed up and sent into retirement without 
ceremony, shouldered aside by smart aleck Masters of Business Administration. 
The businessman of the future, as Putin imagines him, is a steely prototype, 
designed to put an end to the sanguine stereotype that the world has come to 
recognize as the Russian oligarch. The nexus of luck, pluck and personal 
ambition that vaulted oligarchs and “mini-garchs” to market dominance for nearly 
two decades already had diminished to quaint anachronism when President 
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Vladimir Putin stepped up to the podium of the Federation Council last week to 
address lawmakers on Russia’s urgent need for a professionalized native labor 
force. (1)  The speech delivered by Putin outlined a series of measures aimed at 
building up the nation’s professional cadres—world-class analysts, pioneering 
technologists, and top-notch management—trained by experts at publicly-
financed business administration programs. The president’s vision for the future 
of the Russian workplace closed a chapter of Russia’s post-Soviet cultural history 
and opened a new one, populated by vastly better-groomed characters, 
managers capable of sustaining and building upon the recent gains to the 
Russian economy in the years to come.  
             
Unfortunately, the focus and scope of the president’s professionalization program 
were obscured by the unsavory tone of his speech, barbed with demagogic 
appeals to push foreign executives out of the Russian workplace. His vision 
represented the blunt challenge of an outgoing president to his government and 
to the Russian people, a call to take back the corner offices from an elite strata of 
foreign specialists who have set Russia’s corporate agenda for too long. (2)  His 
provocative rhetoric caught the attention of several business dailies, in which he 
was quoted as saying: “You know that management, that thin layer of upper 
management is made up mainly of foreign specialists. And until we achieve 
‘import substitution’ not just in major companies, but in all other economic 
sectors, we will be beaten by imports.” (3)  Putin did not want for bombast to 
convey the ambition of his vision for the Russian marketplace, but in place of 
optimism his words conveyed a sense of insecurity that Russians are in danger 
of falling behind the foreigners in their midst. 
             
The speech set off a buzz of speculation in Russia’s business community. While 
skittish foreign executives sought reassurance from the government that their 
positions were secure for the moment, news analysts highlighted the growing 
volume of anti-foreigner rhetoric coming from officials. Bloggers picked up on 
comments made that same day by Nikolai Patrushev, head of the Federal 
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Security Service, alleging that foreign agents are hatching plans to dismember 
Russia, (4) to draw the conclusion that xenophobia is in full swing ahead of 
upcoming elections. (5)  Sources close to the president dismissed the idea that 
chauvinism was coloring the administration’s policies as unfounded speculation. 
One insider reduced the president’s nationalistic rhetoric to the bland slogan, 
“invest in Russia,” and pointed to an analogous recommendation by Putin to 
owners of Russian football clubs to cultivate native talent instead of spending 
millions abroad. (6)  Dmitri Peskov, official Kremlin spokesman, repackaged the 
president’s words into an upbeat message aimed at foreign executives in Russia: 
“It doesn't mean that Russians are preferable, but the process by which they are 
becoming compatible and competitive with their foreign colleagues is very 
satisfying,” he is quoted as saying. (7)  
             
The administration’s benign spin was taken up by Andrew Somers, president of 
the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia, a man eager to keep foreign 
investment flowing into the country: “I don’t take it as hostile to foreign 
management but as a challenge to the Russian business community to 
accelerate the education of their top managers so they are not too dependent on 
foreign workers.” (9)  Others are less sanguine. “Putin going all Robert Mugabe is 
nothing more than further affirmation that Russia is the world’s largest banana 
republic, only without the nice weather,” quipped an anonymous representative of 
the foreign business community living in Moscow. (9) 
             
The image of Russia as a backward nation is certainly contrary to the message 
of progress that Putin apparently had intended to convey, and a distressing 
distraction from his program to advance the professional culture in Russia. A 
spirit of international cooperation only will aid measures already undertaken by 
the government to build a world-class labor force, a fact acknowledged by Putin 
when he welcomed the recruitment of foreign experts to serve on the faculty of 
the newly-established Skolkovo Business School. Billed as the “Harvard of the 
East,” the management institute currently under construction is set to open in 
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2009. (10)  Russian management programs already are beginning to turn out the 
first round of native-schooled business candidates who are being recruited 
immediately upon graduation by many the country’s leading firms. (11)  
             
The president’s insinuation of a foreign monopoly over upper management came 
as a surprise to experts who point out that the popular perception of an elite class 
of foreigners sitting at the head of Russian companies simply does not 
correspond to reality. Peter Forro, senior consultant at the executive recruitment 
firm Neumann International, reviewed the country’s leading firms and found that 
foreigners are in fact a relative rarity among upper management, and practically 
non-existent within the hierarchy of the country’s strategic sectors. (12)  A few 
high-profile executives such as Peter O’Brien at Rosneft are exceptional cases, 
invited to join the elite ranks of government-appointees heading the country’s 
energy giants, in order to give the Russian firms an “internationalist” advantage 
by attracting investment and raising capital in the global marketplace. (13) 
             
The economic prognosis is rosy. Putin has overseen the emasculation of the 
oligarchs as a class and facilitated the rise of a new managerial class equipped 
to take the helm of a strong and stable national economy. In effect, Putin is 
reinventing the image of the “new Russian.” Just as the market demanded 
connections and cunning in the pre-Putin era, the post-Putin (or is it Putin-
continued) market promises to reward professional expertise and efficiency. As 
the president nears the end of his second and, conceivably, final term in office, 
he can point to his project to transform Russian business culture as an extension 
of his legacy. Whether the country’s newly-minted Masters of Business 
Administration will carry on Putin’s understanding of the global market as a geo-
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Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
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Elections & espionage – Patrushev’s rant 
On 2 December, Russia will hold legislative elections. In the past few weeks, the 
implications of these elections have increased, due in no small part to President 
Vladimir Putin’s intimation that he might consider heading the United Russia list 
and, consequently, the Government. One of the “preconditions” for such a move 
apparently is that United Russia does particularly well in the forthcoming election. 
(1) 
    
Although it is doubtful that anything other than victory will result for the 
President’s party, Russian authorities are determined to cover their bases by 
making “security” a central electoral theme. Not surprisingly, the lead fear-
monger is FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev. 
    
On 10 October, Patrushev was interviewed by Argumenty i fakty. Patrushev 
claimed that Russia was at risk of destabilization, due to the influences of foreign 
intelligence agencies, which are funding “actions against Russia,” as well as 
focusing on “obtaining information about the situation related to the upcoming 
State Duma and presidential elections in Russia.” (2)  The goal of foreign 
agencies, according to Patrushev, is to “exploit protest elements existing in 
Russia to benefit their respective governments.” (3)  Not surprisingly, the 
agencies singled out by Patrushev were the CIA, and Britain’s MI6, for which he 
reserved special vehemence.  
    
MI6, Patrushev stated, has “since the times of Queen Elizabeth I…operated on 
the principle that the ends justifies the means. Their main methods are money, 
bribery, blackmail and immunity from prosecution.” (4)  Patrushev’s net went 
wider than simple “direct operations.” Patrushev commented that the CIA and 
MI6, together with Turkish Intelligence (which is allegedly seeking to turn 
Russia’s Muslim population against Moscow), (5) are using their proxies in the 
Baltic States, former Soviet Republics and satellite states to carry out anti-
Russian operations. (6)  
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While the focus on MI6 may be explained in part by the ongoing diplomatic row 
between Britain and Russia over the murder of Aleksandr Litvinenko, Patrushev’s 
comments against former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states probably have two 
aims: First to appeal to Russian nationalism, and second, to create the 
impression for “ordinary Russians” that “spies” are “all around them,” (7) and that, 
therefore, to vote for a change in the Duma, (thereby potentially denying Putin’s 
ambition) would be dangerous for Mother Russia. 
 
In brief: SVR under new leadership--Is Fradkov himself ex-KGB? 
For the last seven years, Sergei Lebedev has been head of Russia’s Foreign 
Intelligence Service, the SVR, which succeeded the KGB’s First Chief 
Directorate. On 8 October, President Putin signed two decrees. The first 
removed Lebedev from his post at SVR, while the second appointed former 
Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov in his stead. (8)  
    
Mikhail Fradkov has served in a number of Russian governments, including stints 
in (former SVR chief) Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov’s government as Minister 
for Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, and then, Minister of Trade. (9)  At 
first glance, his career would appear to be entirely political—and as such, his 
appointment to the SVR may seem somewhat strange—why would a civilian be 
appointed to such an influential post? It must be said, that it is highly unlikely for 
an individual with no intelligence training to be given such a position. However, 
an examination of Fradkov’s career indicates that he may have long-time ties (at 
least) to the Intelligence Services. 
    
In 1973, at the age of 23, Fradkov was posted to New Delhi, where he worked in 
the Soviet Embassy’s Foreign Trade and Economic section. (10)  The Soviet 
Union’s Foreign Trade department allegedly was a long-term cover for the KGB’s 
First Chief Directorate. (11)  If this is true, it would go some length towards 
explaining Fradkov’s career path, in the sense that he may be following in the 
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tracks of Yevgeni Primakov, who moved from the SVR to the Foreign Ministry 
and thence to the Prime Minister’s post during the 1990s, taking many of his 
people with him.  
    
Assuming that the KGB-Foreign Trade ties are valid, it is possible that Fradkov 
was a Primakov loyalist before joining President Putin’s team, with his 
appointments first to Head of the Tax Police in 2001, and then to the Premiership 
in 2004. As such, Fradkov’s move to the SVR may be an appointment acceptable 
to both Putin and Primakov. 
 
Politkovskaya update: FSB “traces” murder weapon 
Since early September, Russian authorities claim to have made significant 
progress in the Politkovskaya murder case. A number of individuals, including an 
FSB Officer, have been arrested and charged with conspiring over 
Politkovskaya’s murder. Together with the Prosecutor General’s office, the 
Security Services are claiming that Politkovskaya was murdered in order to 
discredit President Putin, and that the conspiracy was run from abroad, with 
Chechens serving as the assassins. (12)  
    
On 7 October, Petros Garibyan, the lead investigator in the case was interviewed 
by Novaya gazeta. Garibyan claimed that the authorities are now certain who the 
“trigger man” was, although he has not yet been charged. Garibyan also noted 
that he and his team had some “interesting suggestions” as to who had ordered 
the assassination, but would not “say anything more.” The “professionally 
cunning intermediate link” apparently still needs to be found. (13)  Clearly, the 
Security Services would like to build more of a case before naming the usual 
“villain” of the piece: Boris Berezovsky.  
    
Three days after Garibyan’s interview, “sources in the law enforcement agencies” 
claimed that they had traced the murder weapon left at the scene (a Makarov 
pistol) to an “underground workshop” in Dagestan, where weapons were built 
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from scavenged parts. The workshop apparently was discovered in the course of 
a special operation. (14)  The tracing of the murder weapon likely will be followed 
in coming weeks, given the history on this case to date, by revelations on how 
Berezovsky supposedly set up and pulled off the hit. 
 
Gosnarkontrol: Anti-corruption arrests as excuse for takeover? 
On 3 October, Lieutenant General Aleksandr Bulbov, Head of Operations for 
Gosnarkontrol (GSK)—Russia’s equivalent to the DEA—was arrested in 
Moscow. (15) Two other high-ranking officials in the service, named as Yuriy 
Geval, Head of Internal Security, (16) and Major Sergei Donchenko (17) were 
arrested within days of Bulbov’s detention. All three officers have been charged 
with a variety of offenses, including extortion, bribery, (18) abuse of office, 
exceeding their powers, and illegal wire-tapping. (19)  
    
A response to the arrests by Viktor Cherkesov, Head of GSK, was not long in 
coming. Cherkesov attempted to obtain Bulbov’s release by sending several of 
his deputies to the court, to vouch for Bulbov’s character and to seek his release. 
(20)  More surprisingly, Cherkesov submitted an open letter to Kommersant, in 
which he argued that the arrests were part of “infighting among the special 
services,” (21) and that action must be taken to prevent “scandal and all-out 
fighting,” which would lead to a “disintegration of the network” (of former KGB 
Officers) running the country. (22) Cherkesov also noted that a significant 
number of Security Service officers had become involved in private enterprise 
since 1991, and that such moonlighting had to be rectified: “we mustn’t allow 
warriors to become traders…We mustn’t shift from normal to arbitrary ways.” (23)  
Cherkesov’s comments well may have been poorly thought through, but however 
inadvertent it was, the statement lends credence to the administration’s anti-
corruption campaign. It also may be used against Cherkesov in the near future.  
    
Cherkesov’s argument vis á vis internecine struggle is probably prescient: the 
arrests at GSK likely mark an attempt by FSB to subsume yet another agency. 
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But, agency take-over is clearly not the whole picture. The moves against GSK 
may be part of a wider anti-corruption campaign being waged at present by Putin 
and Viktor Zubkov, a campaign that appears designed as a purge to clear an 
over-powerful executive and open the way to a Putin Premiership. (24) 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) "Concluding Remarks at the United Russia Party Congress," President Putin, 
1 Oct 07 via www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/10/01/2210_ 
type82912type82913type84779_146510.shtml, accessed October 4, 2007.  
(2) “Foreign Intelligence Services Interested In Domestic Situation Ahead of 
Elections,” Agentstvo voyennykh novostey (Internet Version), 10 Oct 07; OSC 
Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) “Bribery, Blackmail and Bond-Style Gadgets. What The FSB Says Britain is 
Up To in Russia,” The Guardian, 11 Oct 07. 
(5)  “FSB Head: UK, US Secret Services Try To Influence Domestic Situation in 
Russia,” Interfax, 10 Oct 07; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(6) “FSB Head: US, UK Intelligence Use Baltic States To Influence Situation in 
Russia; ‘Britain Trying to Influence Situation in Russia With Help of Baltic Secret 
Services—FSB Chief,’” Riga BNS News In English, 11 Oct 07; OSC Transcribed 
Text; Interfax via World News Connection. 
(7) “Putin Spy Accuses UK of Russia Destruction Plot,” The Daily Telegraph, 11 
Oct 07 via 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml;jsessionid=1VLMHWAKKA45RQFIQMFSF
FWAVCBQ0IV0?xml=news/2007/10/11/wrussia111.xml  
(8) “Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Chief Steps Down, Mikhail Fradkov 
Appointed,” ITAR-TASS, 9 Oct 07; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection.  
(9) “Faces of The New Government,” Moskovskii komsomolets, 6 May 99; 
Moskovskii komsomolets via Lexis-Nexis.  
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Translated Text via Lexis-Nexis.  
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07 via The New York Times.  
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(17) “Moscow Court Sanctions Arrest of Another Anti-Drugs Official,” ITAR-
TASS, 5 Oct 07; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(18) “Secret Police Struggle Rocks Russia,” The Independent, 11 Oct 07 via 
www.independent.co.uk/europe/article3047628.ece  
(19) “Gen. Bulbov Officially Charged With Illegal Wire-Tapping—Source,” 
Interfax, 10 Oct 07; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(20) “Kremlin Infighting Gets An Airing: An Article By An Ex-KGB Officer Sounds 
The Alarm Over Spy Agency Figures in Top-Government Jobs,” Los Angeles 
Times, 10 Oct 07 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(21) Ibid.  
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International Herald Tribune, 9 Oct 07 via 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Carol Northrup 
 
Russia warns of renewed space race                   
On 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union shocked the international community when 
it launched the world’s first man-made satellite; Sputnik orbited the earth for 
nearly three months emitting a high-pitched signal that reverberated around the 
world.  The Soviet Union’s apparent technological superiority caused panic in the 
West and ignited a race for dominance in space.  The fear, of course, was not of 
the satellite itself, but of the rocket that had launched it into space  – the world’s 
first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).  Not only did Sputnik give the USSR 
instant “superpower” status, it added a new dimension to the Cold War (1) and 
raised concerns about the ability to wage war in or from space. 
             
Half a century later, the Soviet Union is no more, but echoes of competition 
reverberate through US-Russian relations.  On 1 October, the Pentagon 
announced a second successful test of its Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
system, (2) which eventually is to be incorporated into a European-based missile 
defense network. President Bush signed a new US Space Policy last year 
reemphasizing America’s right to act in space, (3) and the US government 
repeatedly has rejected calls for a ban on space weapons. 
 
Though the White House is taking great pains to reassure Russia that its anti-
missile defense system will not be targeted at Russia and that the new space 
policy is aimed at defending US assets in space, the Kremlin does not appear to 
be convinced.  President Putin has made it very clear that Russia will do 
everything it can to counter any missile defense system, and other senior 
Russian officials are calling for the US to halt any further militarization of space. 
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Last week Russian Space Forces Commander, Col. Gen. Vladimir Popovkin 
warned that Russia would take appropriate measures, should any country decide 
to deploy weapons in outer space:  “We don’t want to fight in space, but on the 
other hand, we’ll not allow any other country to play the master in outer space.” 
(4)  “If any country deploys weapons in space, then the laws of warfare are such 
that retaliatory weapons will definitely emerge ...  This process may have an 
avalanche effect.” (5)  Maj-Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin, former director of the 4th 
Central Research Institute of the Russian Defense Ministry, stated, that while the 
anti-missile system of the US is unreliable against ballistic missiles, it can engage 
other nations’ undefended satellites with “near 100 percent probability,” (6) 
thereby putting at risk every system in space.  Dvorkin stated that Russia also 
has the potential for producing weapons designated to fight in space (though to a 
lesser extent than the US) and warned that current US policies could drive 
Russia to “reanimate” this capability. (7) 
             
Several high-level Russian officials and academicians have joined Dvorkin and 
Popovkin in advocating an international space treaty to avoid the militarization of 
space.  Popovkin warned that though only Russia and the US currently are 
capable of putting weapons in space, China, Europe and several other countries 
rapidly are developing the capability. (8)  Russian scientist Roald Sagdeyev from 
the Russian Academy of Sciences pointed out that the successful test of a 
Chinese anti-satellite missile last spring (9) should have made it clear to the 
world that some sort of space treaty is needed.  Russia has developed a 
framework for such a treaty and claims to have Chinese support, (10) but 
allegedly has pointed out that the US has reacted very “ambiguously” to such 
efforts. (11) 
             
All this rhetoric does not mean, of course, that the Kremlin is planning to curtail 
Russian space research and development.  Russia says it has earmarked $1.4 
billion for space this year (an increase of 6 percent over last year), doubled 
spending for space navigation and has plans to increase overall space spending 
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by 20 percent next year. (12) Officials also have announced plans to conduct 
twenty scientific space projects by 2015, including manned flights to Phobos—a 
Mars satellite—and to the Moon. (13)  The head of the Russian Space Agency, 
Anatoli Perminov, says Russia has even bigger plans for the very long term, 
including a space station on the Moon, a space shuttle, and a man on Mars 
within 30 years. (14)  Perminov also says that the Russian satellite navigation 
system GLONASS will overtake the US GPS constellation by 2011. (15)  (The 
US currently controls 98 percent of the world’s satellite navigation.) 
             
Acting First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov is a driving force behind the 
strengthening of Russia’s space program and has suggested that “cosmonautics” 
ought to be added to President Putin’s list of national projects. (16)  In an 
interview last month, Ivanov stated that space was a priority for Russia on the 
same level of importance as its nuclear capability. (17)  Ivanov listed four 
indicators of “space sovereignty” to be used to judge leadership in space 
exploration:  launch services, ground-based infrastructure, production of space 
apparatus and training. (18)  Of these four, Ivanov says Russia needs 
improvement in all but launch services. (19)  Ivanov’s views are echoed by Duma 
members, who have called for a restoration of the balance of power in space to 
ensure economic, social, and military advancement in Russia.  (20) 
             
Russia clearly understands the geopolitical power that comes with mastery of 
space and recent announcements are in line with Kremlin moves to reassert 
Russia’s place as a global power.  But desiring to be an international space 
power and planning to lead the world in space research does not make it so.  
Though Ivanov claims spending has doubled from 0.5 percent of GDP in 2001 to 
nearly 1 percent today, (21) most doubt Russia will be able to meet many of its 
lofty space goals.  Current Russian satellites are notoriously unreliable, and even 
the re-invigorated Russian economy is unlikely to be able to meet the exorbitant 
costs required to overcome nearly twenty years of neglect in space research and 
development. By way of comparison, NASA’s FY 07 budget is over $16 billion, 
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(22) more than eleven times the Russian space budget.  While Russia may 
succeed in convincing the international community to work toward universal 
“rules of play” in space, it is very unlikely that it will be able to take the lead in a 
new space race. 
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Despite Sarkozy’s charms, the stalemate continues 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy made his first official visit to Moscow for two-
day talks with President Vladimir Putin where energy, economic relations and 
human rights were on the agenda. (1) Above all, the meeting appears to have 
been an attempt to increase bilateral cooperation and to better align the positions 
of Russia and the West across an array of current international issues. In the 
weeks leading up to his visit, Sarkozy traveled through Eastern Europe criticizing 
Russia for its use of oil as a lever in Europe and for the Chechen conflict, as well 
as categorizing Russia as a country that “complicates the resolution of major 
world problems.” (2) Russia’s position opposite the West on recent issues 
regarding Kosovo, the US missile defense system, and Iran’s nuclear ambitions, 
he said, appears to be an attempt to reassert its political clout by “sowing division 
to boost influence” in negotiations with the West. (3) With Putin’s resistance to 
western pressure and Sarkozy’s critical comments in recent weeks, Sarkozy’s 
“charm offensive” (4) in Moscow came as a surprise. At their first meeting, Putin 
recited a Russian poem, and Sarkozy stated his commitment to understand the 
Russian perspective. (5) Throughout the visit, both leaders appeared to draw 
attention to their willingness to better understand their conflicting perspectives 
and to diminish the friction that has been developing between Russia and the 
West. 
 
From reports during the visit, strained relations between Russia and France 
seemed to be absent, as Putin and Sarkozy praised one another and 
reinvigorated bilateral cooperation on a number of projects, particularly trade 
between the two countries, which has increased by 37% since 2005. (6) Sarkozy 
stated that France aimed to avoid protectionist policies and to invest in “large 
Russian companies, such as Gazprom.” (7) Putin also promised transparency in 
any Russian companies with European investors and restated Russia’s 
commitment to increased investment in Europe. In regard to the Iranian uranium 
enrichment program, Sarkozy stated that Russian and French “positions have 
moved much closer together” on inspections at Iranian facilities and transparency 
 21 
regarding its nuclear ambitions. (8) Though Russia previously had opposed 
Kosovo’s request for independence from Serbia, Sarkozy hinted that the two had 
discussed a possible “path” toward a solution, but this path was not laid out to the 
press. (9) At a symbolic set piece event, Putin and Sarkozy unveiled a memorial 
to French WWII pilots in a park in Moscow to symbolize appreciation for the 
efforts of French and Russian soldiers fighting side by side against the Nazis. 
(10) 
 
The cozy visit between the two leaders in Moscow seems to suggest that 
Sarkozy is conscious of the need for continuing the appearance, at least, of the 
close relationship with Putin, established by his predecessor Jacques Chirac. 
Based on reports of the visit, the economic relationship between Moscow and 
Paris has been strengthened and both leaders outwardly emphasized the 
benefits of a close partnership. If Sarkozy successfully plays the role of mediator 
between Russia and the rest of the West, it would certainly strengthen his hand 
in Europe as he takes the helm of the rotating EU presidency in the second half 
of 2008. (11) If Putin is seen by the international community as more willing to 
open the diplomatic lines of communication on these issues, it could further his 
ambitions for Russia’s role as a major global player. As Sarkozy noted, it is the 
intent of Europe to become one of the poles in Russia’s vision for a multi-polar 
world. (12) 
 
The actual impact of Sarkozy’s visit is dubious. Although it was reported that the 
two leaders views had become closer, it appears that Russia’s position remains 
relatively unchanged.  In regard to further sanctions against Iran, President Putin 
stated this week, following the visit with Sarkozy, that given the lack of “objective 
data,” Russia would “proceed from the assumption that Iran has no such plans.” 
(13) 
 
Additionally, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defense Minister 
Anatoli Serdyukov met with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and 
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Defense Secretary Robert Gates in Moscow on 12 October for the stated 
purpose of bridging the widening gap regarding the proposal by the US to deploy 
a missile defense system in Eastern Europe. (14) The reports from this meeting 
suggest that attempts to reduce the tensions between Russia and the West have 
failed. The US states that the missile defense system is designed to shoot down 
long-range missiles launched by “rogue states,” notably Iran, but Russia 
continues to object to the proposed US missile defense system, stressing that 
Iran doesn’t have the long-range missile technology or nuclear warheads (as 
yet), against which the system is designed. (15) 
 
It appears that rather than the positions of Russia and the West moving closer 
following Sarkozy’s charm offensive, Putin emphasizes positions that differ 
markedly from those of the West. 
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Russian Federation: Special Feature 
By Alexey Dynkin 
 
ENERGY POLITICS 
Debt – what debt? 
Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas monopoly, has announced that the latest 
conflict between Russia and Ukraine over payments for Russian gas deliveries 
has been resolved. According to the company’s statement, issued after a 
meeting between Gazprom Head Aleksei Miller and Ukrainian Minister of Fuel 
and Energy Yuri Boiko on October 8, the Ukrainian debt is to be repaid by 
November 1, with the first payment, a sum of $200 million, due by October 24. In 
case of failure to repay the debt in full by November 1, Acting Director of the 
transit company RosUkrEnergo Konstantin Chuychenko added that gas 
deliveries to Ukraine would be cut in proportion to the unpaid amount. (1) 
 
This round of the dispute began on October 2 (just days after Ukraine’s 
parliamentary elections), when Gazprom announced that Ukraine owes more 
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than $1.3 billion for gas deliveries and threatened to cut deliveries if the debt was 
not repaid – warning European consumers of possible transit problems if the 
dispute was not resolved. (2) The Ukrainian government responded that, first, 
this debt is not owed by the state, and, second, that the amount presented by 
Gazprom is exaggerated. According to the president’s representative to the 
cabinet of ministers of Ukraine, Aleksandr Shpalak, this debt actually breaks 
down into three parts. First, the Ukrainian state-owned gas company Naftogaz 
Ukraine owes $700 million to UkrGazEnergo – the company that provides gas 
purchased through Gazprom to the Ukrainian market. Second, UkrGazEnergo 
owes another $300 million to RosUkrEnergo, and third, RosUkrEnergo itself 
owes yet another $300 million to GazpromExport. (3)  In total, then, the debt 
indeed comprises $1.3 billion, but if the breakdown that Shpalak presented is 
accurate, then Gazprom’s presentation of this amount as the amount owed to it 
raises some interesting questions. To understand this, it is necessary to 
understand a bit about the way in which Gazprom exports gas to Ukraine. 
 
In 2004, during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma (and when Viktor Yanukovich 
was serving as Prime Minister), RosUkrEnergo was set up as an intermediary 
company through which Gazprom would export Central Asian gas to Ukraine. 
The company was registered in Switzerland as a “joint venture between Russian 
and Ukrainian shareholders.” (4)  As it turns out, the shareholders may be both 
Russian and Ukrainian, but both executive directors, Konstantin Chuychenko and 
Dmitry Glebko, their Ukrainian-sounding names notwithstanding, are quite 
prominent in the Russian energy sector. Glebko is the former deputy head of the 
Moscow Representation of Ural Trans Gas and Chuychenko is head of the Legal 
Department and member of the board of OJSC Gazprom. In addition, three of the 
eight members of the company’s Coordination Committee (Valeri Golubev, 
Aleksandr Medvedev and Sergei Khomyakov) are deputy chairmen of Gazprom, 
and one, Stanislav Tsygankov, is the head of the foreign-economic department of 
Gazprom. (5)  The other distribution company, UkrGazEnergo, was set up more 
recently—in early 2006—under then-Prime Minister Yuri Yekhanurov of the Party 
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of Regions. It is co-directed by Gazprom vice-chairman Alexander Ryazanov, 
who is also a member of RosUkrEnergo's board; and Naftohaz Ukrainy vice-
chairman Ihor Voronin, who is, according to Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown 
Foundation, “widely believed to have close links with RosUkrEnergo, and was 
listed as a member of the latter's board in 2004.” (6)  The function of 
UkrGazEnergo is to purchase the gas, itself purchased from Gazprom, from 
RosUkrEnergo, and only then sell it on the Ukrainian market. (7) In this way, 
Gazprom is able to export Russian and Central Asian gas directly to Ukrainian 
consumers, bypassing Naftohaz altogether.    
 
Considering the relationships between prominent figures in these companies and 
their relationship with Gazprom, it becomes apparent that both RosUkrEnergo 
and UkrGazEnergo essentially serve as fronts for the former. But why go through 
the motions of setting up supposedly “joint” companies with Ukrainian partners, 
and then have them sell each other gas before selling it to Ukraine? One reason 
already was mentioned – to bypass Gazprom’s Ukrainian counterpart Naftohaz 
and sell its gas directly on the Ukrainian market. The other reason, whether 
originally intended or not, has been demonstrated very well by the latest gas 
dispute. As noted earlier, it began when Gazprom presented Ukraine with a bill of 
$1.3 billion. When that figure was broken down into who really owed what to 
whom, it became evident that in reality only the $700 million that Naftohaz owes 
to UkrGazEnergo legitimately can be considered a Ukrainian debt to Russia; the 
remaining amount consists of money that Gazprom’s front companies owe to 
each other or to Gazprom. But since these companies are theoretically 
Ukrainian, Gazprom is able to present the full sum as a Ukrainian debt and, as a 
result, inflate the real Ukrainian debt nearly twofold.  
   
Since the whole thing had been presented as a “national” Ukrainian debt to 
Russia, it ultimately had to be resolved by a meeting of the two prime ministers – 
Viktor Yanukovich and Russia’s new Prime Minister, Viktor Zubkov. Here, one 
cannot help but notice the close timing of the dispute with the recent 
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parliamentary victory of Ukraine’s Orange coalition, which, according to 
Gazeta.Ru, creates a strong possibility that Yanukovych’s post soon will be held 
by Yulia Tymoshenko, who has made it a point to promise to make major 
changes in Ukraine’s gas relationship with Russia, if she becomes prime 
minister. (8)  According to this scenario, the reason for presenting such a huge 
debt at this time is to take advantage of a pro-Russian Ukrainian government 
while it is still in power. As Gazeta.Ru further notes, whoever eventually does 
end up winning the prime ministerial post will find it very difficult to reverse the 
decision that already has been made. (9)  It is very unlikely that Tymoshenko 
would have bent to Russian demands as easily as Yanukovich. 
 
Another question is to what extent, if any, the dispute may be related to the 
recent re-shuffling of the Russian government. In other words, was there any 
particular reason for having Russia’s new prime minister meet with his 
counterpart in Ukraine, whose own days in office are likely numbered? Certainly 
the crisis appears to have been resolved rather strongly in Russia’s favor; not 
only was Ukraine compelled to acknowledge Gazprom’s version of the debt, but 
it promised to repay in very short order – after all, the November 1 deadline gives 
it barely three weeks to come up with the sum (although indications are that it will 
end up having to pay most of it in kind). If the idea was to give the new Russian 
prime minister an easy victory, it seems rather obvious that the ultimate 
beneficiary of this victory is Putin. Indeed, after meeting with Zubkov, Yanukovich 
immediately met with Putin in what has been described as a rather sharp 
conversation, with Putin essentially telling Yanukovich that in the future 
Ukrainians can expect to become dependent on Gazprom directly, and advising 
Yanukovich that Ukraine’s “governing structures” should make plans accordingly. 
To this, Yanukovich reportedly had nothing to say but “we understand this very 
well.” (10)  If that is the case, there seems little doubt about who the ultimate 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Robyn Angley 
 
NAGORNO KARABAKH 
Nagorno Karabakh’s new leader asks to be heard 
Azerbaijan’s separatist region, Nagorno Karabakh, held elections for a new 
president on 19 July. The winner was Bako Saakian, who garnered 81.1 percent 
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of the vote, according to Nagorno Karabakh’s election committee. (1)  Masis 
Mailian was the only other candidate to get a percentage of the vote that 
exceeded single digits. He received 12.5 percent of the vote. (2)  The candidates 
were competing to replace Arkady Gukasian, who served as president for the 
constitutional limit of two five-year terms. The new president was sworn in on 7 
September and the inauguration was attended by Armenian president (and 
former president of Nagorno Karabakh) Robert Kocharian, as well as 
representatives of the Georgian separatist republics of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. Not surprisingly, Azerbaijan declared the elections illegitimate. 
 
Bako Saakian is a native of Nagorno Karabakh. He was born in Stepanakert and 
has a degree in law. His early career involved working as the Moscow 
representative of the Armenian Interior and National Security Ministry. (3) He 
also served briefly as Nagorno Karabakh’s foreign minister. (4)  In 1999, he 
replaced Artur Aghabekian as Nagorno Karabakh’s Interior Minister. Saakian 
headed Nagorno Karabakh’s Interior Ministry until 2001 (5) and served as the 
head of the Nagorno Karabakh security services from 2001 to June 2007, when 
he resigned in order to run for president. Saakian’s candidacy received the 
support of the four parties represented in Nagorno Karabakh’s parliament: the 
Democratic Party of Artsakh, the ARF Dashnaktsutyun, the Azat Hayrenik Party 
and the Movement 88 party. (6) 
 
Saakian has moved to have his Nagorno Karabakh government formally included 
in the OSCE Minsk Group peace process. The Minsk Group is co-chaired by 
France, Russia, and the United States. Along with Azerbaijan and Armenia, 
Nagorno Karabakh participated in the talks from the time of the 1994 ceasefire 
agreement until 1997.  At that point, former President of Nagorno Karabakh 
Robert Kocharian assumed the post of Armenian Prime Minister. His participation 
in the negotiations seemed to represent both Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia, 
and Nagorno Karabakh representatives ceased to take an official part in the 
talks. Azerbaijan now refuses to negotiate with Nagorno Karabakh 
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representatives. On 16 September, Saakian met with the co-chairs of the OSCE 
Minsk Group for the first time. Perhaps tellingly, he had already met with a group 
of Russian politicians and other notable figures on 13 September. (7) 
 
Any attempt to resolve Nagorno Karabakh’s status in the foreseeable future will 
have to take into account the multi-layered connections between Armenian and 
Nagorno Karabakh politics and politicians. Armenian President Kocharian has 
stated that the Nagorno Karabakh elections were carried out without Armenian 
interference, citing as evidence the fact that neither he nor Armenian Prime 
Minister Serzh Sarkisian traveled to Nagorno Karabakh to back any of the 
candidates during the campaign. (8)  Both Kocharian and Sarkisian are Nagorno 
Karabakh natives, who transitioned into Armenian politics in the 1990s. 
 
The relationships between Saakian, Kocharian, and Sarkisian are somewhat 
unclear. In February 1994, Saakian represented Nagorno Karabakh in the 
meeting that led to a draft of a ceasefire agreement. The significance of those 
negotiations lay not in the ceasefire (it didn’t hold), but in the other participants.  
Representing Armenia at the talks was then Defense Minister and current Prime 
Minister Serzh Sarkisian. (9) Sarkisian is reported to be a strong Saakian 
supporter. (10)  Kocharian, on the other hand, was rumored to have opposed 
Saakian’s inclusion as national security chief in former Karabakh President 
Gukasian’s cabinet in 2002, but Saakian was included anyway. (11)  Adding to 
the complex tapestry of Caucasian politics, on 12 October, Saakian met with 
former Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosian in Stepanakert. (12)  Ter-
Petrosian only recently emerged from political seclusion, aiming harsh criticism at 
Kocharian, who had succeeded him as president in 1998, following clashes over 
a potential Nagorno Karabakh settlement. 
 
The underlying theme of the issue of personal and political relationships among 
the three leaders consists of the connections and interweaving of Armenian 
politics in Nagorno Karabakh. Armenian Prime Minister Sarkisian is a potential 
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successor to Kocharian, based on the strong performance of his Republican 
Party in May’s parliamentary elections. The nature of the Kocharian-Saakian 
relationship certainly will have a strong bearing on the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh 
for the rest of Kocharian’s tenure. Also, the relationship between Kocharian and 
Sarkisian will have an effect on Nagorno Karabakh’s ability to play a role in 
determining its future status. According to some reports, Saakian has Sarkisian’s 
backing, (13) meaning that any political sparring between Sarkisian and 
Kocharian within Armenia could have reverberations in the Nagorno Karabakh 
conflict if Saakian is seen as a Sarkisian protégé. With Armenia’s presidential 
elections scheduled for February 2008, Kocharian’s political maneuvers (one 
possible scenario involves him becoming prime minister à la Putin) likely will 
place Nagorno Karabakh negotiations on hold until Armenian domestic politics 
are settled. 
 
Azerbaijan also is scheduled to hold presidential elections in the next year. The 
net result of upcoming elections in Armenia and Azerbaijan is that no resolution 
of the Nagorno Karabakh’s status is likely until presidential politics in Azerbaijan 
and Armenia are sorted out. However, if the elections in those two countries 
produce leaders who are seen to have broad legitimacy, then those leaders 
might be able to make compromises of the sort required to resolve the Nagorno 
Karabakh conundrum. 
 
In the meantime, the inclusion of Saakian’s Nagorno Karabakh government in the 
negotiations is extremely unlikely. Azerbaijan opposes it, and Armenia benefits 
from being the only representative of the Nagorno Karabakh side of the conflict. 
Perhaps if a viable opponent to the Kocharian clique contests and wins the next 
presidential elections, then Kocharian, as a parting gesture, might change his 
stance on Nagorno Karabakh’s formal inclusion in the Minsk Group process as 
an attempt both to weaken the president-elect and to accrue power for 
Kocharian’s potential return to Nagorno Karabakh. However, even with former 
Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosian’s recent emergence from relative 
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political seclusion, an Armenian political scenario that does not include either 
Kocharian or Sarkisian remains only a remote possibility. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
UZEBEKISTAN 
Will Karimov win Uzbek elections without waging a campaign? 
On September 18, Uzbekistan’s Central Election Commission (CEC) finally 
announced that new presidential elections indeed would be held before the end 
of the year, on December 23, (1) ending speculation by many Central Asia 
watchers as to whether or not President Karimov would bother holding an 
election campaign at all, regardless of his country’s constitutional requirements.  
Those who predicted that he would not, may be only half wrong: thus far, 
although the CEC is making preparations for the balloting process itself, there 
has been very little in the way of actual campaigning and Karimov has yet to 
announce his own candidacy. 
 
The campaign period began on September 21 with five parties and one “initiative 
group of voters” fielding candidates: the Adolat (Justice) Social Democratic Party 
nominated its central council first secretary, Dilorom Toshmuhammadova; (2) the 
Milliy Tiklanish (National Revival) Democratic Party nominated its central council 
chairman, Hurshid Dostmuhamedov (who currently is also deputy speaker of the 
Uzbek parliament's Legislative Assembly); (3) the People's Democratic Party 
(which, with 41 seats, has the second largest faction in parliament) nominated 
the leader of its parliamentary faction, Asliddin Rustamov; (4) the Fidokorlar 
(Self-sacrificers) National Democratic Party nominated its Central Council First 
Secretary and parliamentary leader, Akhtam Tursunov; (5) and the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (UzLiDep) has proposed nominating incumbent 
President Islom Karimov as its candidate and will discuss his nomination at a 
party congress scheduled for early November.  UzLiDep reportedly enjoys the 
support of powerful businessmen and entrepreneurs and therefore is considered 
to be one of the more influential parties.  All five parties support President 
Karimov’s policies for gradual reform. (6)  A group of 300 Uzbek citizens has 
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formed an “initiative group of voters,” as sanctioned by the constitution (7) and 
nominated its own candidate, Akmal Saidov, who will run as an “independent” 
candidate.  This is the first time that an independent candidate is being permitted 
to participate in a presidential election, although it is unlikely that his participation 
will have any effect on the election’s outcome.  Apparently several other 
candidates, including chairman of the opposition Erk Party Muhammad Solih and 
human rights activists Abdillo Tojiboi ugli and Ahtam Shaimardanov attempted to 
join the race, but did not “submit all the necessary documents on time,” 
preventing their names from being included on the ballot.  Uzbek electoral law 
requires that all of the parties and groups sponsoring candidates submit their 
documents to the CEC no later than 70 days prior to the date of the election. (8)  
It is quite curious, however, that all of those groups whose candidates’ views do 
not coincide with those of President Karimov were unable to meet the CEC’s 
registration deadline. 
 
The campaign itself, now nearly a month underway, promises to progress very 
quietly.  An October 13 broadcast of the television show “Election is the mirror of 
democracy,” which profiled the five presidential candidates, featured six experts 
who discussed the nomination and registration process, as well as what qualities 
potential presidential candidates should possess. (9)  Rather oddly, none of the 
five candidates or any of their supporters was invited to participate in the 
program, in order to explain their electoral platforms to the voters.  Then again, if 
all five candidates’ views correspond with those of the incumbent president, 
perhaps providing them with access to state-controlled media is unnecessary; as 
long as voters are familiar with Karimov’s policies, they have all the knowledge 
they need in order to make an informed choice for president.  In fact, the Uzbek 
government seems far more concerned about the political influence foreign 
NGOs might have on voters, than about whether or not Karimov’s opponents are 
being granted fair and equal access to the state-controlled media.  A state radio 
broadcast in early October on the perfidious influence of NGOs warned listeners: 
“Certain powerful countries and the centres of political forces, pursuing their own 
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goals, are trying to occupy other countries by using NGOs. They are trying to 
occupy the minds of the people of countries which they are going to bring under 
their area of influence, and thus trying to make them dependant from them…As a 
conclusion we can say that we should fight and prevent any ideological threat 
directed against us and our country, and develop further the ideological immunity 
of young people with unshakeable belief.” (10)  With the onset of the presidential 
campaign, the fears raised by the now mostly defunct “color revolutions” once 
again appear to be reverberating throughout Uzbekistan’s leadership. 
 
The central question, now that election preparations are underway, is what 
method President Karimov will choose to maneuver his way around the issue of 
term limits, in order to remain in power for a third term of office.  Karimov has 
been Uzbekistan’s leader since 1989, when he was appointed as First Secretary 
of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee.  His title was changed to 
“president” in 1990, and in 1991, he won Uzbekistan’s first presidential elections.  
In 1995, his first term of office was extended via popular referendum until 2000, 
when he was re-elected for a second term.  In 2002, the presidential term of 
office was extended from five years to seven, once again via popular 
referendum. (11)   Article 90 of Uzbekistan’s constitution currently permits a 
president to serve only two consecutive terms in office. One option open to 
President Karimov is to amend the constitution to permit three consecutive terms 
in office; such an amendment would require approval by a two-thirds majority in 
parliament (Oliy Majlis), following a nationwide debate on the proposed 
amendment. (12)  Although Karimov surely would have no trouble obtaining 
parliamentary approval for a third term, he still may consider this process to be 
bothersome and unwieldy.  A second option is for the president to declare that 
due to the fact the presidential term of office was extended in 2002, he has, in 
fact, only served one full, seven-year term in office and is therefore free to stand 
in the December 2007 election. (13)  Of course, if parliament and/or the 
constitutional court could be persuaded to make such an announcement on 
Karimov’s behalf, it would make his claim to another term virtually ironclad. 
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Karimov has not yet announced his candidacy; he may be waiting for UzLiDep’s 
party congress to officially nominate him as a candidate, or perhaps he and his 
inner circle intend to wait until shortly before the election, in order to give the 
public as little time as possible to consider the (un)constitutional ramifications of 
what will, in fact, be his third term in office. 
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UKRAINE 
Orange again:  Yushchenko and Tymoshenko reunite 
On 16 October, parties supporting Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko and 
former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko signed a coalition agreement that will 
see the return of Tymoshenko as prime minister and the return of an “orange” 
government after over a year out of power. 
 
The deal came just hours after final results were released by the CEC in the 
country’s snap parliamentary elections. (Note: At press time, the Kyiv 
Administrative Court blocked the printing of final results, while it considers an 
appeal against the results by the Communist Party.  The court must release its 
finding within five days, and it is unlikely to alter the outcome.) 
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During the elections, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) increased its support by 
over seven percentage points, while the coalition supporting Tymoshenko’s rival, 
Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, saw one of its members (The Socialist Party) 
fail to pass the threshold to enter parliament.  These two factors will allow 
Tymoshenko to put together a slim parliamentary majority of 228 against 222, 
consisting of her bloc and Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense Bloc 
(OU-PSD).  It is a remarkable comeback for two blocs that spent almost 1 ½ 
years in opposition. 
 
The two groups were consigned to opposition following the 2006 parliamentary 
elections, when tensions between the two led to months of negotiations to create 
a majority.  Yanukovych was able to use the time to broker a backroom deal with 
the Socialists, who until that point had been a solid member of the orange 
coalition.  This allowed Yanukovych to become prime minister.  The Socialists’ 
change of allegiances also was one of the primary reasons given by Yushchenko 
for the dismissal of parliament and calling of the 2007 snap vote.  The party, he 
said, had betrayed Ukrainians who voted for the Socialists, believing the party 
would support an orange coalition. 
 
In total, the 2007 results show a swing of around 30 seats from Yanukovych’s 
coalition to Tymoshenko’s.  When elections were called, the opposition controlled 
roughly 200 seats compared to Prime Minister Yanukovych’s 250, out of a total of 
450.   Now, Tymoshenko’s coalition will control 228 to Yanukovych’s 222. 
 
The coalition agreement wouldn’t have been possible one year ago and could be 
the latest sign of Ukraine’s growing—if nascent—democratic political culture. 
Indeed, the ability of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko to work together after falling 
out over two years ago, may signal an understanding by these politicians of their 
accountability to voters and of the need for cooperation, in order to fulfill their 
objectives.   In particular, Yushchenko has had to recognize Tymoshenko’s 
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electoral success, which outpaced even the most generous predictions of 
political pundits. 
 
In the run up to the election, Yushchenko and his bloc often repeated their 
commitment to a “democratic coalition.”  During the last week of the campaign, 
as polls showed BYuT performing far better than OU-PSD, Yushchenko’s bloc 
even went so far as to use Tymoshenko’s image in their final campaign 
advertisement. 
 
Despite this, it is no secret that Yushchenko views Tymoshenko as a potential 
rival in the upcoming 2010 presidential elections, particularly given that her 
popularity now outstrips his own.  It also is no secret that some within Our 
Ukraine would prefer a coalition with Yanukovych (based primarily on business 
ties).  However, despite these factors, the president’s bloc has no choice but to 
follow through on its campaign promises.  The fate of the Socialists is a major 
lesson to politicians, as is the loss in popularity of Our Ukraine after an ill-fated 
attempt in 2006 to form a coalition with Yanukovych. This new awareness of 
voter backlash is a major step forward for Ukraine’s political development. 
 
What can we expect from a Tymoshenko government? 
The coalition agreement released this week clearly states that Tymoshenko will 
be nominated as premier, based on her bloc’s almost 31% vote tally as 
compared to OU-PSD’s 14%.  The 50 page agreement also delineates post 
distribution procedures, spells out the coalition’s program (melding the two 
campaign programs into “Ukrainian Breakthrough: For the People, not 
Politicians”), and lists fourteen bills that will be introduced before the government 
is approved. 
 
The first three bills that likely will be submitted are the Law on Opposition, Law 
on Imperative Mandate and the Law on the Cabinet. 
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The Law on Opposition, as originally written by BYuT in 2006, would have 
provided an official opposition at least the same rights as most opposition forces 
are afforded in Western European parliamentary republics.  For example, the bill 
gave opposition representatives control of important parliamentary committees 
and introduced the idea of a British style “shadow cabinet.” 
 
The current bill has not been released, but according to Tymoshenko, it 
maintains most of its original provisions while taking into account a number of 
changes urged by Yushchenko.  These suggestions from Yushchenko include 
granting the “opposition” ministerial portfolios and control over key state 
departments (perhaps including the State Property Fund).   In this way, 
Yushchenko said, such “compromises” would unify those in the country who 
voted for both the majority and the opposition. (1) 
 
This level of capitulation to the “opposition” is unheard of in developed 
parliamentary republics. Thus, although the US Democratic Party controls the US 
Senate by only one seat, it would never invite Republicans into the leadership. 
 
If Ukraine is to develop a true majority-minority system that honors and protects 
the rights of an opposition, undermining the ability of the opposition to criticize 
the government by inviting it into the government is the worst possible idea. 
 
Perhaps for this reason, Tymoshenko (and reportedly her allies within 
Yushchenko’s OU-PSD), rejected immediately the idea of providing ministerial 
portfolios to the Party of Regions.  Instead, the coalition is offering one post of 
Deputy Prime Minister for Relations with the Verkhovna Rada and the 
opportunity for Deputy Minister posts within a number of ministries.  These 
Deputy Minister posts would be one of at least ten deputy ministers provided to 
each minister.  Moreover, they can be dismissed by the Prime Minister and are 
not privy to the inner workings of the cabinet. 
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Tymoshenko’s willingness to accept this compromise signals a continuing 
respect for Yushchenko’s position and perhaps a new understanding of the need 
for give and take with her opponents. 
 
The opposition’s powers will make the cabinet’s job much more difficult than it 
was for Yanukovych, who routinely ignored the opinions both of the opposition 
and the president.  Then, Tymoshenko’s opposition had no legal recourse.  
Prime Minister Tymoshenko will provide the legal recourse to Yanukovych that 
was not provided to her. 
 
The Law on Imperative Mandate, which would allow the loss of a deputy 
mandate for not following the decisions of the bloc’s leader or political council, 
has been criticized heavily by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (PACE).  PACE views the legislation as restricting the free will of 
individual deputies. 
 
However, while this is a concern in developed parliamentary democracies, 
Ukraine faces a serious problem with bribery and intimidation inside the 
Verkhovna Rada.  Ukrainian media report frequently on charges that the votes of 
deputies were bought for millions of dollars. 
 
In 2006, the orange coalition failed when one party summarily changed sides 
without explanation to support Yanukovych, disavowing years of previous 
condemnation of him.  In 2007, Yanukovych’s majority steadily increased its 
numbers with defectors from Our Ukraine and  BYuT; defections for which no 
reason was given.   When dismissing that parliament, Yushchenko condemned 
“a policy of intrigues and betrayal” within the Rada. 
 
Following this latest election, representatives from  BYuT and Our Ukraine 
privately worried that the Party of Regions would use various “techniques” to “pull 
away” deputies from the majority coalition. 
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This concern led Yuriy Lutsenko, number one on the OU-PSD electoral list, to 
urge former Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov to leave the bloc.  Yekhanurov is 
said to be close to Yanukovych and has been critical of a majority coalition with  
BYuT.  “If Yuriy Ivanovych (Yekhanurov) or whoever does not like such a format 
of parliamentary majority,” he said, “and if he believes it to be a mistake, he is 
free to vacate his seat and then start criticizing us as much as he chooses.”  (2) 
 
Despite European concerns about individual rights of deputies, the situation in 
Ukraine requires legislation that will punish severely members of parliament who 
actively undermine their own party or bloc.  This type of activity has caused 
serious instability in Ukraine’s parliament and recently led to the need for snap 
elections.  If it is not stopped, Ukraine cannot develop a stable government. 
 
Furthermore, it will be very difficult for the new cabinet to achieve its goals 
without an imperative mandate law.  A thin margin, with a small contingent of 
hostile deputies, is not workable.  A revolt of just four deputies conceivably could 
block the confirmation of Tymoshenko and lead to yet another political crisis. 
 
It is for this reason that the majority has signaled its intention to fight for passage 
of the Law on Imperative Mandate before a vote is taken on the new government 
and before parliamentary committees are formed.  Should a portion of Our 
Ukraine deputies refuse to vote in favor of this law before committees are 
formed, these deputies could be sidelined by not being awarded committee 
chairmanships, memberships, prestigious offices or other perks that come with 
being part of a majority.  Once assigned to a committee and office, it would be 
nearly impossible to remove or to influence them. 
 
In addition to the Law on Imperative Mandate, President Yushchenko, in 
particular, is interested in alterations to the Law on the Cabinet.  That law, 
passed in early 2007, drastically cut the powers of the president.  In many areas, 
 42 
it appears to contradict the responsibility given to him in the constitution – for 
example, to oversee foreign and defense policy.  Tymoshenko and Lutsenko 
have vowed to ensure that the law is in line with the constitution and to return to 
Yushchenko a number of the powers that were removed from him with its original 
passage.   
 
Tymoshenko’s opponents suggest that her support for reinvesting Yushchenko 
with powers at the expense of the prime minister signals she will challenge 
Yushchenko in 2010.  However, it is more likely that Tymoshenko will work for a 
clearer, more balanced distribution of power – at least for now.  The  BYuT 
leader reportedly has suggested that she may support Yushchenko for president 
if he actively supports her policies as Prime Minister.  Challenging him now would 
undermine her ability to enact her program. 
 
Even without the Law on the Cabinet, Ukraine’s prime minister holds significant 
power, thanks to constitutional changes that came into effect in January 2006.  
The president would like these changes rescinded in the next parliament and is 
pushing for it to happen before the confirmation of the new prime minister.  Since 
a constitutional majority of 301 deputies would be necessary, however, it appears 
unlikely that Yushchenko will be granted this wish.  It also is unclear how many 
BYuT members would support such a move, even though Tymoshenko has been 
the one politician consistently critical of the constitutional changes. 
 
The biggest challenges 
Assuming that the Tymoshenko government takes office at the end of the month 
as planned, it will face numerous daunting challenges. 
 
Most importantly, it will need to negotiate a new gas price with Russia, at a time 
when energy prices are soaring.  Tymoshenko also repeatedly has vowed to 
renegotiate Ukraine’s current overarching gas deal with Russia with the aim of 
removing all intermediaries from the process.  Primary among these 
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intermediaries is RosUkrEnergo, a shadowy “broker” between Ukraine and 
Gazprom.  Unfortunately for Ukraine, the broker is half owned by Gazprom, 
meaning that the country has received extremely unfavorable “deals” over the 
last several years. (See the new special feature, Energy Politics, for more on this 
issue.) 
 
In addition to gas negotiations, the new Tymoshenko government will need to 
decide how to deal with state companies and property that were sold significantly 
under market value in the final days before the election.  The sales of two 
companies may be challenged in court.  In addition, the “sale” of over 3,000 
hectares of land in Kyiv by Kyiv Mayor Leonid Chernovetsky already has 
spawned a court case resulting in an injunction against the transfer of at least 
some of the land.  In fact, it is possible that Chernovetsky could face criminal 
charges for abuse of power by distributing land in a manner that is alleged to 
have been outside legal channels. 
 
The new Ukrainian government also will face a number of basic economic 
problems – inflation that may be as high as 14%, increasing wage and pension 
arrears, a deficit that exceeds EU requirements, inadequate funding of health 
care and education, and an inability to provide basic services in some villages. 
 
In an interview prior to the election, Tymoshenko listed the difficulties her new 
government (if elected) would face.  “We often say that we are working 20 hours 
a day now so that we can work 24 hours a day after the election,” she said.  
“There are just so many problems.  It will take years before everything will be 
normalized and we can relax.” (3)   
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